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Confidential stuff – in hospital cardiac arrests
A new report describes room for improvement in the care of cardiac arrest patients in hospital1.
The National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD) aimed to describe variability and identify remediable factors in the process of care of adult patients who receive resuscitation in hospital, including factors which may affect the decision to initiate the resuscitation attempt, the outcome and the quality of care following the resuscitation attempt, and antecedents in the preceding 48 hours that may have offered opportunities for intervention to prevent cardiac arrest.
Data were captured over a 14 day study period in late 2010 from UK hospitals, and were reviewed by an expert panel.
The summary is available here. I have picked out some findings of interest:
- An adequate history was not recorded in 70/489 cases (14%) and clinical examination was incomplete at first contact in 117/479 cases (24%).
Appreciation of the severity of the situation was lacking in 74/416 (18%). Timely escalation to more senior doctors was lacking in 61/347 (18%). Decisions about CPR status were documented in the admission notes in 44/435 cases (10%). This is despite the high incidence of chronic disease and almost one in four cases being expected to be rapidly fatal on admission. Where time to first consultant review could be identified it was more than 12 hours in 95/198 cases (48%). Appreciation of urgency, supervision of junior doctors and the seeking of advice from senior doctors were rated ‘poor’ by Advisors. Physiological instability was noted in 322/444 (73%) of patients who subsequently had a cardiac arrest. Advisors considered that warning signs for cardiac arrest were present in 344/462 (75%) of cases. These warning signs were recognised poorly, acted on infrequently, and escalated to more senior doctors infrequently. There was no evidence of escalation to more senior staff in patients who had multiple reviews. Advisors considered that the cardiac arrest was predictable in 289/454 (64%) and potentially avoidable in 156/413 (38%) of cases. The Advisors reported problems during the resuscitation attempt in 91/526 cases (17%). Of these, 36/91 were associated with airway management. Survival to discharge after in-hospital cardiac arrest was 14.6% (85/581). Only 9/165 (5.5%) patients who had an arrest in asystole survived to hospital discharge. Survival to discharge after a cardiac arrest at night was much lower than after a cardiac arrest during the day time (13/176; 7.4% v 44/218; 20.1%).
In the opinion of the treating clinicians, earlier treatment of the problem and better monitoring may have improve outcome:
Compare these findings with a smaller scale confidential enquiry into the care of patients who ended up in intensive care units, published exactly 14 years ago by McQuillan et al2:
“The main causes of suboptimal care were failure of organisation, lack of knowledge, failure to appreciate clinical urgency, lack of supervision, and failure to seek advice.”
One of the co-authors of the McQuillan study, Professor Gary Smith , has spent years improving training in and awareness of the importance of recognition of critical illness, and pioneered the “ALERT” Course TM: Acute Life-threatening Emergencies, Recognition, and Treatment. Professor Smith provides commentary on the NCEPOD report and the slides are available here, including a reminder of the ‘Chain of Prevention’3.
It’s a shame this issues remain a problem but it is heartening to see NCEPOD tackle this important topic and provide recommendations that UK hospitals will have to act upon. It is further credit to the vision of Pete McQuillan, Gary Smith and their colleague Bruce Taylor (another co-author of the 1998 confidential inquiry). These guys opened my eyes to the world of critical care and trained me for 18 months on their ICU, which remains a beacon site for critical care expertise and training. Without their inspiration, I may not have ended up in emergency medicine-critical care and I doubt very much that Resus.ME would exist.
1. Cardiac Arrest Procedures: Time to Intervene? (2012)
National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death (NCEPOD)
2. Confidential inquiry into quality of care before admission to intensive care
BMJ 1998 Jun 20;316(7148):1853-8 Free Full Text
OBJECTIVE: To examine the prevalence, nature, causes, and consequences of suboptimal care before admission to intensive care units, and to suggest possible solutions.
DESIGN: Prospective confidential inquiry on the basis of structured interviews and questionnaires.
SETTING: A large district general hospital and a teaching hospital.
SUBJECTS: A cohort of 100 consecutive adult emergency admissions, 50 in each centre.
MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Opinions of two external assessors on quality of care especially recognition, investigation, monitoring, and management of abnormalities of airway, breathing, and circulation, and oxygen therapy and monitoring.
RESULTS: Assessors agreed that 20 patients were well managed (group 1) and 54 patients received suboptimal care (group 2). Assessors disagreed on quality of management of 26 patients (group 3). The casemix and severity of illness, defined by the acute physiology and chronic health evaluation (APACHE II) score, were similar between centres and the three groups. In groups 1, 2, and 3 intensive care mortalities were 5 (25%), 26 (48%), and 6 (23%) respectively (P=0.04) (group 1 versus group 2, P=0.07). Hospital mortalities were 7 (35%), 30 (56%), and 8 (31%) (P=0.07) and standardised hospital mortality ratios (95% confidence intervals) were 1.23 (0.49 to 2.54), 1.4 (0.94 to 2.0), and 1.26 (0.54 to 2.48) respectively. Admission to intensive care was considered late in 37 (69%) patients in group 2. Overall, a minimum of 4.5% and a maximum of 41% of admissions were considered potentially avoidable. Suboptimal care contributed to morbidity or mortality in most instances. The main causes of suboptimal care were failure of organisation, lack of knowledge, failure to appreciate clinical urgency, lack of supervision, and failure to seek advice.
CONCLUSIONS: The management of airway, breathing, and circulation, and oxygen therapy and monitoring in severely ill patients before admissionto intensive care units may frequently be suboptimal. Major consequences may include increased morbidity and mortality and requirement forintensive care. Possible solutions include improved teaching, establishment of medical emergency teams, and widespread debate on the structure and process of acute care.
3. In-hospital cardiac arrest: is it time for an in-hospital ‘chain of prevention’?
Resuscitation. 2010 Sep;81(9):1209-11
The ‘chain of survival’ has been a useful tool for improving the understanding of, and the quality of the response to, cardiac arrest for many years. In the 2005 European Resuscitation Council Guidelines the importance of recognising critical illness and preventing cardiac arrest was highlighted by their inclusion as the first link in a new four-ring ‘chain of survival’. However, recognising critical illness and preventing cardiac arrest are complex tasks, each requiring the presence of several essential steps to ensure clinical success. This article proposes the adoption of an additional chain for in-hospital settings–a ‘chain of prevention’–to assist hospitals in structuring their care processes to prevent and detect patient deterioration and cardiac arrest. The five rings of the chain represent ‘staff education’, ‘monitoring’, ‘recognition’, the ‘call for help’ and the ‘response’. It is believed that a ‘chain of prevention’ has the potential to be understood well by hospital clinical staff of all grades, disciplines and specialties, patients, and their families and friends. The chain provides a structure for research to identify the importance of each of the various components of rapid response systems.